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Despite large-scale revisions in the past fifteen years," the law of
defamation2 remains unpolished and incomplete. These rough edges
threaten to undermine the ends sought by the Supreme Court in its
radical rewriting of the law. In particular, when the Court has
formulated standards of journalistic care in the libel area, it has failed
to address the evidentiary dimension of these standards. This omission
I. Prior to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the prevention and
punishment of libelous statements was thought "never . . . to raise any Constitutional
problem," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). In Sullivan, the
Court for the first time recognized the need to reconcile the law of defamation with the
First Amendment. 376 U.S. at 279. Sullivan held that a public official could recover in a
defamation action only on a showing of "actual malice," defined as knowledge of a
statement's falsity or reckless disregard of its truth. Id. at 279-80. in Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), five justices extended the actual malice rule to defama-
tion suits by public figures. Id. at 164-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result); id. at
170-72 (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.); id. at 172-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting,
joined by White, J.). A plurality of the Court later adopted the actual malice rule for
plaintiffs involved "in an event of public or general concern." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court rejected Rosenbloom
and restricted the actual malice rule to defamation suits by public officials or public
figures. Id. at 346. But the Court also required private individuals, regardless of their
involvement in matters of public interest, to demonstrate fault on the part of the de-
fendant for recovery of actual damages and to demonstrate actual malice for recovery of
punitive or presumed damages. Id. at 347-50. Since Gertz, the Court has focused primarily
on refining the distinction between public and private figures. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976) (wealthy socialite not public figure for purpose of
report on her divorce); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 47 U.S.L.W. 4840, 4842-43
(U.S. June 26, 1979) (person who engages in criminal conduct not automatically public
figure for purposes of comment on his conviction); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 47 U.S.L.W.
4827, 4834 (U.S. June 26, 1979) (neither successful application for Federal funds nor post-
libel access to press renders plaintiff public figure). For a description and analysis of the
public figure aspect of defamation law, see Note, The Editorial Function and the Gertz
Public Figure Standard, 87 YALE L.J. 1723 (1978). In contrast to public figure scrutiny, the
meaning of the terms "fault" or "actual malice" has received little attention. Numerous
courts since Gertz have applied the standards to specific situations. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 459 (1976) (fault); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1116-17
(6th Cir. 1978) (actual malice); Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1227-29 (3d Cir. 1978)
(actual malice). However, there has been little theoretical analysis of either the fault or
actual malice standard. This Note will explore this more neglected side of the Gertz
opinion.
2. A defamatory communication has been defined as an attack on a person's character
that tends "to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence" in which he is held,
"or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him." IV.
PROSSEa, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTs 739 (4th ed. 1971). The law of defamation
manifests society's "pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks
upon reputation." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
1735
The Yale Law Journal
undermines press3 freedom by inducing constitutionally unwarranted
self-censorship,4 permitting a judge or jury to penalize unpopular
speech, and discouraging potential defamation plaintiffs from taking
steps to mitigate reputational harm.
This Note proposes, as a supplement to existing standards of care,
an evidentiary rule limiting inquiry at defamation proceedings to the
circumstances confronting the journalist 5 as he sends an article to press.
Focusing only on knowledge the journalist reasonably could have ascer-
tained would eliminate much of the uncertainty from present stan-
dards, minimize the risk posed to unpopular speech, and provide an
incentive to potential libel plaintiffs to prevent false tarnishing of
their reputations.
I. Gertz: A New Constitutional Balance
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc." reversed a decade-long trend of Supreme
Court decisions expanding the categories of defamation plaintiffs who
3. The term "press" includes members of both the print and broadcast media. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-50 (1974) (repeated references to "publishers
and broadcasters"). In analyzing current defamation standards, this Note focuses on the
difficulties facing the institutional press; its proposed remedy, however, also may be
applied to suits involving nonmedia defendants. See note 62 infra (proposed rule does
not define special privilege for institutional press).
4. The term "self-censorship" has two meanings. In its descriptive sense, "self-censor-
ship" occurs whenever a journalist refrains from publishing material for legal reasons.
See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 Tax. L. REv. 422, 430-31 (1975). Be-
cause laws sometimes are intended to curtail speech injurious to other values, see, e.g.,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (establishing obscenity standards), this type
of self-censorship may be acceptable, see Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 1646 (1979)
("[1]f the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of damages liability for publishing
knowing or reckless falsehoods, those effects are precisely what New York Times and
other cases have held to be consistent with the First Amendment."); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.) (First Amendment
freedoms limited by sanctions designed to safeguard others' interests). In its normative
sense, however, "self-censorship" refers to a needless restraint on First Amendment free-
doms. Statutory restraints in the name of a competing value that inhibit speech more
than is necessary to protect that value are unconstitutional. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518, 522 (1972) ("the statute must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to
punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected
expression"). A similar rule has been announced to govern judicial restraints on speech
in the defamation area. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) ("It
is... appropriate to require that state remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no farther
than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved."); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (First Amendment encompasses state court applying
common law of defamation in civil proceeding).
5. This Note concentrates on the journalist as the prime victim of legally induced
self-censorship, but the term "journalist" is intended to include all those in a media
organization who contribute to publication decisions.
6. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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could recover only upon proof of the defendant's "actual malice.' 7 The
Gertz Court held that the plaintiff was neither a public official nor
a public figure, and thus that the lower courts had erred in applying
the actual malice rule;" it also went further, however, holding that states
could define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher or broadcaster charged with libel of a private individual, so
long as the states did not impose liability without fault, that is, adopt a
standard of strict liability.0 In addition, the Court limited recovery of
damages, absent a showing of actual malice, to that necessary to com-
pensate "actual injury."' 0
The Gertz holding advanced prior law on three major fronts. First,
Gertz recognized that a rule of strict liability inhibits press freedom
even when applied in defamation suits by private individuals." Under
such a rule, the press can avoid liability only by ensuring that all de-
famatory publications are truthful.12 Yet because occasional errors are
inevitable, the press can completely avoid liability only by not pub-
lishing defamatory statements. 13 Gertz held that a legal standard in-
ducing such self-censorship violates the First Amendment.' 4
7. According to the original formulation of the term, see note I supra, a statement is
made with actual malice if delivered "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964). Subsequent Court decisions stressed the subjective aspect of the actual
malice test. See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (there must be
sufficient evidence to conclude that "defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication"); cf. Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 1646 (1979) (direct
evidence of reckless disregard for truth entails inquiry into "thoughts, opinions and
conclusions" of defendant); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 n.6 (1974)
(stating that St. Amant "equated reckless disregard of the truth with subjective awareness
of probable falsity").
8. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
9. Id. at 347.
10. Id. at 349. The Court said actual injury was "not limited to out-of-pocket loss,"
but included "impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humili-
ation, and mental anguish and suffering." Id. at 350. The Court found, however, that
requiring the press to pay presumed and punitive damages "unnecessarily exacerbates
the danger of media self-censorship" because these damages bear little or no relation to
states' legitimate interest in compensating actual injury. Id. at 349-50.
11. Id. at 340. The Court said that a rule of strict liability fails "to assure to the
freedoms of speech and press that 'breathing space' essential to their fruitful exercise."
Id. at 342 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
12. Although the numerous privileges to defamation recognized at common law often
allayed in practice the severity of a strict liability rule, only the defense of truth
sheltered the press from liability when these privileges did not apply. See W. PROSSER,
sutra note 2, at 776-99 (outlining six qualified and six absolute defamation privileges,
and truth defense); Anderson, supra note 4, at 443 (many common-law privileges fre-
quently required proof similar to fault).
13. 418 U.S. at 340.
14. Id. The First Amendment protects the flow of truthful information to the public.
See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967) (plurality opinion of Harlan,
J.) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)) (freedom of discussion em-
braces "all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the mem-
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When Gertz proscribed strict liability and required states to premise
defamation recovery on a showing of fault, the Court implicitly recog-
nized the desirability of permitting journalists to publish defamatory
statements without relinquishing control over subsequent liability.15
A fault standard enables a journalist to ensure freedom from liability
by tailoring his conduct to meet legal requirements of thoroughness
and care;16 if requisite standards are met, the journalist can publish
defamatory statements without fear that an unavoidable error will
create liability.17 The flow of truthful information to the public thus
continues relatively unimpaired.
bers of society to cope with the exigencies of their period"). The press plays a central
role in informing citizens unable to devote themselves full time to the gathering of facts.
See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975) (limited citizen resources
to observe operations of government first hand places great responsibility on press to
report governmental activities fully and accurately). Undue press self-censorship thus
directly impedes the pursuit of democratic self-government. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (self-censorship under strict liability "dampens the
vigor and limits the variety of public debate"). Moreover, because postponing the dis-
semination of information can have irreversible consequences, even temporary restraints
on speech may be constitutionally intolerable. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 559 (1976) (burden on government of justifying prior restraint not reduced by
temporary nature of restraint).
15. The Court introduced the fault requirement in order to protect the press in any
defamation suit from the hazards of strict liability. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 347 (1974). The Court justified its holding by pointing to the necessity of "pro-
tect[ing] some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters." Id. at 341. Sullivan
had advanced a similar argument to justify applying the actual malice rule to defamation
suits by public officials. 376 U.S. at 271-72.
As a standard of care, fault parallels, in less stringent form, the proof requirements of
the actual malice rule. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 461-62 (Gertz and Sullivan stan-
dards "functionally analogous .... differing only in the quantum of fault required"). In
analyzing deviations from a fault-based standard of care, this Note identifies problems
common to both the actual malice and fault rules.
16. In Sullivan, Justices Black and Douglas adhered to the absolutist position that
permitting defamation recovery in any form is unconstitutional. 376 U.S. at 293 (Black,
J., concurring). Although this position would restrict speech even less than a standard
of due care, no other Justice has ever embraced it. See Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635,
1649 (1979) (Court has regularly found complete immunity from defamation liability "un-
tenable construction of the First Amendment"). Because the absolutist position ignores
"the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury," Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 342 (1974), this Note will not consider it as an appropriate constitutional
balance.
17. Early in its constitutional discussion of defamation, the Court illustrated the
journalistic care required by the actual malice standard. See Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 157-59, 165, 169-70 (1967) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.) (Warren,
C.J., concurring in result) (it is at least actual malice to publish without verification
serious charges by unreliable source when no time pressure exists; it is not actual malice
to publish damaging article by reliable correspondent when there is time pressure and
story is internally consistent). Although less frequently addressed, the requirements of the
fault standard are gradually becoming clarified. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448, 459 (1976) (fault when most damaging from among several conceivable interpretations
is chosen unless choice is true); Lake Havasu Estates, Inc. v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 441 F.
Supp. 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (not fault to publish story without checking whether others
had same name as subject of article).
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Second, by requiring a fault-based standard for liability, the Gertz
Court acknowledged that unpopular speech is threatened when legal
rules are tied to the content of a statement.' 8 In pursuing the constitu-
tional goal of diverse public debate, the First Amendment protects
speech regardless of its popularity.19 A strict liability rule jeopardizes
this diversity by conditioning legal sanctions on the false content of
defamatory statements, thus making the content of a publication central
to the defamation trial. Basing liability on a standard of conduct safe-
guards diversity by focusing on a journalist's actions in publishing a
statement rather than on the content of the statement itself.20
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,21 a three-judge plurality of the
Court had ignored the importance of content-neutrality in the First
Amendment area by extending the actual malice rule to defamation
suits concerning matters of "public or general concern. ' 22 Gertz re-
turned to content-neutrality by rejecting assessment of the public in-
terest as a legitimate test for defining the scope of the actual malice
rule. The Court reasoned that a content-based standard would involve
judges in the dangerous business of determining "'what information
is relevant to self-government.' "23 Nor did the Gertz Court believe that
concern for unpopular speech was more safely entrusted to jurors; the
Court limited juries' power to award punitive damages because they
would be "free to use their discretion selectively to punish expressions
of unpopular views. ' 24 Each ruling reflected the Court's opinion that
18. See 418 U.S. at 346 (unacceptable to determine liability on basis of public-interest
test). The goal of protecting speech from suppression on the basis of unpopular content
is a theme sounded repeatedly in the defamation cases. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150-51 (1967) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.) (unacceptable to im-
pose sanctions on basis of what one thinks or publishes); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (restraint on criticism of government inconsistent with
First Amendment); cf. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.")
19. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (First Amendment at-
tempts "to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources.' ") (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1943)).
20. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (plurality opinion of
Harlan, J.) ("Impositions based on misconduct can be neutral with respect to content of
the speech involved .... ); cf. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276-77 (1971)
(in contrast to standard of care, standard of "relevance" unlikely to be neutral with
respect to content of speech and holds danger of becoming instrument of suppression of
vehement attacks).
21. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
22. Id. at 43-44 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
23. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (quoting Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). The Gertz Court
"doubt[ed] the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges." 418 U.S. at
346.
24. 418 U.S. at 350.
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undue focus on the content of a statement threatened to transform
defamation law into a tool for suppressing unpopular speech rather
than for redressing defamatory falsehood.
Finally, Gertz underscored the duty of the subject of a libelous
article to invoke available self-help remedies when possible in order to
mitigate defamatory harm.2 5 Thus, it varied the duty of care that a
journalist owed the subject of a defamatory publication according to
the subject's access to means of rebuttal. 26 Because private individuals
generally lack an effective forum for reply,27 they have a greater need
for legal protection than do public figures. The Court responded to
this need by requiring a lesser standard of proof for suits by private
persons. 28
Despite its major contributions to defamation law, Gertz failed to
address several significant issues. Although the Court required a
fault-based standard for liability, it failed to discuss the evidentiary re-
quirements of such a standard; 29 nor were the evidentiary requirements
of the actual malice rule articulated with any greater precision than in
previous cases.30 The Court continued to focus on defining various
categories of defamation plaintiffs at the expense of explaining the
substantive standards of liability applicable to these categories. 31 Fur-
thermore, although Gertz voiced a general preference in the First
Amendment area for liability standards based on conduct rather than
content, it applied this preference only to reject the public-interest test
and to employ the fault and actual malice standards. The Court failed
to recognize that current evidentiary practices also permit the content
of a statement to influence a defamation proceeding. Finally, although
25. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). "Self-help" involves the use
of "available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to
minimize its adverse impact on reputation." Id.
26. See id. (noting public figure's greater access to media and greater opportunity
for rebuttal as partial justification for premising recovery on higher standard of proof.
Elsewhere the Court has advanced a similar rationale. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 47 U.S.L.W. 4840, 4841 (U.S. June 26, 1979); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.).
27. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
28. Although a public figure must prove actual malice in order to recover for de-
famatory falsehood, a private individual need demonstrate only fault. Id. at 342-48. Mr.
Justice Harlan had earlier urged the same distinction. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 70-72 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding only that states
cannot "impose liability without fault").
30. See id. at 342, 349 (restating Sullivan formulation of actual malice).
31. See note I supra (recent defamation cases primarily address distinction between
public and private figures). Other than contrasting the requisite standards of care with
a rule of strict liability, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 347 n.10
(1974), the Court did nothing to define these standards except to invoke the verbal
formulas of "fault" and "actual malice."
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the Court recognized a role for self-help in mitigating defamatory harm,
it failed to provide incentives that would encourage full use of avail-
able remedies.
II. Inadequacy of the Gertz Liability Rule
Evidentiary practices in defamation law threaten to undermine the
ends sought by Gertz. In contrast to the fault-based system on which
it is theoretically modeled, current defamation law permits the ultimate
falsity of a published account to play an improper role in the evalua-
tion of journalistic care. Because evidence of falsity is admitted in
defamation proceedings, present law impedes the flow of truthful in-
formation to the public, invites judges and juries to suppress un-
popular speech, and provides no incentive for the subject of a de-
famatory statement to employ self-help remedies before publication.
A. An Inducement to Self-Censorship
Judges frequently fail to limit the evidence of falsity introduced by
a libel plaintiff to that reasonably available to the journalist at the
time of publication.3 2 As a result, the ultimate falsity of an article has
an inordinate influence on the court's evaluation of whether a jour-
nalist exercised due care. In this way, defamation standards effectively
become more stringent. For example, despite the subjective meaning
of the term "knowledge" under the actual malice rule,33 judges often
combine the ultimate falsity of a report with a plaintiff's unilateral and
unsubstantiated denial of its truth to impute "knowledge of falsity" on
the part of the journalist, even though at the time of publication the
journalist had encountered no factual evidence contradicting his
article. 34
32. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Dell Publishing Co., 362 F. Supp. 767, 770 (N.D.
Cal. 1973); Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields, 254 Ind. 219, 222-23, 259 N.E.2d 651,
684, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970) (separate opinion of Arterbum, J.). In Church of
Scientology, the court admitted evidence of an expose's falsity although the evidence was
released after publication. 362 F. Supp. at 770. In Fields, the court permitted the plain-
tiff to introduce evidence of an article's falsity in order to prove actual malice without
requiring him to demonstrate that the defendant newspaper knew or should have known
of the evidence prior to publication. Although the jury was instructed to consider only
prepublication evidence of falsity, the defendant noted that such a procedure amounted
to "practically 'drowning' defendant and then attempting to revive him in the end by
an instruction." 254 Ind. at 222-23, 259 N.E.2d at 684.
33. See note 7 supra (citing decisions interpreting actual malice rule).
34. See, e.g., Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 91 N.M. 250, 255, 572 P.2d
1258, 1263 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978) (including conclusory denial by plain-
tiff that charges were "absolutely false" as part of evidence that defendant had knowledge
of falsity); Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wash. 2d 37, 44-45, 515 P.2d 154, 158 (1973)
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Under a fault-based standard of care, the judge or jury should
evaluate a journalist's conduct to determine whether he gave appro-
priate weight to information reasonably available at the time of pub-
lication. Permitting evidence of an article's ultimate falsity to reach
the trier of fact, without regard to whether the evidence was practically
available to the journalist at the time of publication, threatens to prej-
udice assessment of the journalist's conduct in favor of a finding of
actual malice or fault.35 If the trier of fact succumbs to the prejudicial
effect of this evidence, a journalist may be held accountable for a de-
famatory comment even though nothing he reasonably could have done
at the time of publication would have revealed the falsity of the rele-
vant statement. Holding a journalist legally responsible for factors
outside his control conflicts with the premises of a fault-based stan-
dard.36
Under present law, the fear that information unavailable at the
time of publication may subsequently emerge and cast a pall of falsity
on the published article can discourage a journalist from making a
defamatory statement regardless of his immediate assessment of its
truth. The effectively tougher standards resulting from current eviden-
tiary practices may induce increased self-censorship in the same way a
change in the nominal standards would. 37 Enlarging the risk of damage
(finding knowledge of falsity under actual malice rule on basis of ultimate falsity plus
defendant's repeated but unsubstantiated prepublication denials). A conclusory denial by
a plaintiff should not be sufficient to establish a journalist's actual malice. See note 61
infra. Because a standard of recklessness or negligence affords more judicial latitude than
does the actual malice criterion, incorrect applications are more difficult to monitor.
Nevertheless, misuse of evidence of ultimate falsity would render these other standards of
care effectively more stringent as well.
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment g (1976) (warning courts of
jury tendency to decide defendant must have been negligent because it published de-
famatory communication); Anderson, supra note 4, at 465 ("Lawyers will be tempted to
argue-and jurors to believe-that publishers and broadcasters do not innocently dis-
seminate defamatory falsehoods.")
36. Imposing liability for an unforeseeable wrong is inconsistent with the Gertz goal
of protecting the press so long as it exercises reasonable care. See Anderson, supra note
4, at 464-65; cf. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 146 (negligence standards assess conduct, not
consequences). Judicial decisions have stressed the need to separate the issues of truth
and due care. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 35, 55 (1971) (plurality
opinion of Brennan, J.) (information disclosed to defendant after broadcast "has no
probative value" on issue of due care); Kidder v. Anderson, 354 So. 2d 1306, 1309 (La.),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 105 (1978) (issue not ultimate falsehood of defamatory statements
but whether newspaper reporter uttered them with actual malice).
37. Because instances of self-censorship are by definition never subject to defamation
suits, the problem is impossible to monitor by reading decisions. A lack of reported
examples of self-censorship therefore does not imply that the problem is nonexistent.
Indeed, there is evidence such self-censorship by the press has occurred. See note 41
infra (describing example). Although it might seem odd that journalists regulate their
activity according to the intricacies of evidentiary rules, the libel attorney is likely to
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payments38 and legal fees39 increases the journalist's hesitation to print
defamatory material. Moreover, even if the standards of fault and
actual malice come to approximate a rule of strict liability only oc-
casionally, uncertainty as to when this tightening of legal standards
will occur may induce a similar reticence. 40 In each case, a journalist
can ensure nonliability only by refusing to publish defamatory state-
ments: a journalist cannot be certain that, if his published article is
ultimately erroneous, his reporting efforts will be deemed adequate.
Such legal uncertainty provides a powerful incentive beyond that of a
bring home the impact of these rules as he reviews a proposed article. See Anderson, supra
note 4, at 438 ("Post-Times censorship is not exactly self-censorship; it is more accurately
censorship by libel lawyer because the pivotal factors in deciding whether to publish are
ones that the press itself cannot fully evaluate.")
38. It has been argued that the size of a potential libel judgment is the most
significant factor in inducing self-censorship. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 82 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Gertz sought to limit defamation awards
by requiring proof of actual malice in order to recover presumed or punitive damages.
418 U.S. at 350. Although this requirement may reduce substantially the number of
punitive awards, its effect on presumed damages is less clear. Presumed or general damages
traditionally functioned to compensate loss that was difficult to prove in monetary
terms. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 621, Comment a (1938). Since Gertz, this task arguably
has been assumed by damages compensating "actual injury" as it is liberally defined in
that case. See note 10 supra (Gertz definition of "actual injury"); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 475 n.3 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing actual injury award of
$100,000 for "mental suffering"). Moreover, even when damage is not presumed, provable
monetary losses may assume immense proportions. See, e.g., Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Magic
Valley Newspapers, Inc., 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1689, 1692 (Idaho Dist. Ct. 1978) (award-
ing $1.9 million for expenses and lost profits caused by defamatory statement).
39. The expense of defending a defamation suit may itself induce self-censorship. See
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1971) (plurality opinion of Brennan,
J.) (possibility of litigation causes speech to stay clear of unlawful zone); Hume, The
Mayor, the Times, and the Lawyers, [MoRE], Aug. 1974, at 1, 17 (article not published
because cost of defending libel suit might easily bankrupt magazine, even though
magazine likely to have won); Dorfman, The Story Behind the Story, READER (Chicago),
Feb. 2, 1979, § I, at 1, 31 (one publication halted when libel suit explicitly threatened);
cf. Anderson, supra note 4, at 437 (Sullivan privilege "operates at the wrong end
of the litigation"; to prevent self-censorship, must protect press from cost of litiga-
tion). The impact of legal expenses may be strongest for small publications and effectively
silence their coverage of defamatory matters. See Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc.,
211 S.E.2d 674, 690-91 (IV. Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975) (defamation legal ex-
penses "repressive" for small newspapers); cf. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 610 n.40 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Letter of Editor and
Publisher of Anniston (Ala.) Star, quoted in Brief for Washington Post Co. et al. as
Amici Curiae 31-32) (legal expenses from attempt to impose prior restraint render
"obedient silence" only alternative for small-town dailies).
40. See, e.g., Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 939 (1968)
(absence of certainty in law particularly pernicious where speech is concerned because it
tends to deter all but most courageous); Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and The Public's
Right to Know, 46 TEx. L. REV. 630, 634 (1968) (a speaker "steers clear of a barbed wire
fence, but he stays even farther away if he is not sure exactly where the fence is"). In
noting the chilling effect of uncontrolled presumed damage awards, Gertz implicitly
recognized that once liability is found, legal uncertainty may induce self-censorship. See
418 U.S. at 349.
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fault or actual malice standard to shy away from treatment of poten-
tially defamatory subjects. 4 ' Yet the need for this type of self-censorship
is precisely what Gertz sought to obviate in proscribing a strict liability
rule. If evidentiary rules are fashioned to admit only evidence relevant
to the determination of fault or actual malice, then only the self-
censorship explicitly required by defamation law is likely to occur.4- A
journalist could largely control his exposure to liability by ensuring
that his research conformed with requisite standards.
The danger that evidence released after publication will influence
the effective standard of care is most acute when the subject of an
article refuses to disclose evidence exclusively within his possession.
Because no alternative source is available,43 a journalist in this situation
must decide whether to publish a defamatory accusation without access
to highly relevant information. Should the hidden evidence prove
exculpatory and be admitted to a defamation proceeding, the risk of
liability would be great; self-censorship in such instances is likely to
be pronounced. Moreover, rather than encouraging the discovery of
hidden facts, courts have actually penalized efforts to dig below ap-
parent reality.44
41. See, e.g., Dorfman, supra note 39, at I, col. 1. The legal uncertainty that arises
from permitting information released after publication to influence the determination
of fault contributed to a recent decision by Chicago magazine not to run an investigative
story on the alleged CIA connections of several Chicago businessmen. The publisher's
unease with the story began after one individual named in the article denied emphatical-
ly-though without substantiation-all charges levied against him and explicitly threatened
suit. The magazine's efforts to ensure that it had conformed with legal standards of care
were frustrated by the subject's refusal to disclose files in his possession that he claimed
would prove exculpatory. Id. at 29-31. Had liability hinged exclusively on conduct, as it
ostensibly does after Gertz, the magazine could have published the article with little risk
of legal sanction so long as its reporters had behaved in accordance with the requisite
standards of care. Nevertheless, the magazine's attorney felt compelled to warn of "the
conventional learning" that if one of the potential plaintiffs is found to be a private in-
dividual and a negligence standard is applied, "the jury will decide for who[m~ever it
thinks spoke the truth. One does not predict the outcome of situations like that, at least
without having heard both sides' evidence." Letter from A. Daniel Feldman to Raymond
Nordstrand, Publisher, Chicago magazine (June 16, 1978) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
The subject's refusal to grant access to his files rendered this airing of both sides im-
possible. Immediately on receipt of the letter, the publisher decided not to run the story.
Dorfman, supra note 39, at 32.
42. Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 1647 (1979) (one aim of defamation law to
deter those who publish defamatory falsehood with requisite culpability).
43. Both traditional and investigative reporters rely heavily on others for access to
confidential information. See E. EPSTEIN, BEYOND FACT AND FicTION 9-11 (1975) (Tradi-
tional "[j]ournalists readily admit that they are dependent on others for privileged in-
formation and the ascertainment of facts in a controversial issue .... "); P. WILLIAMS,
INVESTIGATIvE REPORTING AND EDITING 7-8 (1976) ("[I]nvestigative reporting . . . usually
involves the gathering of important information which some person or agency is trying
to keep secret.") As a result, an important but uncooperative source of information can
severely hinder a reporter's quest for truth.
44. Courts have pointed to a muckraking intent to support a finding of a failure to
meet the applicable standard of care. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
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B. The Threat to Unpopular Expression
A central aim of defamation law is to protect the expression of a
diversity of views.45 Gertz recognized that diversity is endangered when-
ever the trier of fact considers the content of an utterance. 46 The
court's judgment may then be used to censor unpopular speech rather
than to protect a plaintiff's reputation.47 Yet despite this observation,
current evidentiary rules make no effort to minimize the extent to
which a trier of fact considers a statement's content. If evidence of the
truth of a statement's content were admitted only to the extent it was
probative of fault or actual malice, its impact on the trier of fact would
be reduced and diversity of expression would be endangered no more
than necessary under Gertz.
Even under Gertz, however, determination of fault or actual malice
requires some inquiry into the content of a defamatory statement; a
journalist's conduct can be evaluated only in light of his reactions to
the content of available information. Once evidence of the content of
a statement is admitted to a defamation proceeding, personal bias
towards that content may influence the ultimate judgment. Because a
130, 158 (1967) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.) (pointing to petitioner's policy of "sophis-
ticated muckraking" as possible motive for its adjudged "stretching" of journalistic
standards); Durso v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 33 Ill. App. 3d 300, 305, 337 N.E.2d 443, 447 (1975)
(identifying author's "expos6 intent" and desire to "name names" as possible reasons for
imposing liability for arguably reasonable error of confusing two individuals with same
first and last names). To the extent that courts equate muckraking with malicious
motives, it may be used to justify the application of a more stringent duty of care. See,
e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 459 (1976) (arguably holding petitioner to strict
liability standard because it chose to report most damaging interpretation of ambiguous
document).
Moreover, the need for lengthy investigation that usually attends efforts to expose
hidden information may increase a journalist's risk of liability. Courts often point to
the lack of time pressure on the press as a factor in decisions favorable to defamation
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 519 F.2d 777, 779 (9th Cir.
1975) (citing Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 186, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975)); cf. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee,
63 VA. L. REv. 731, 743-44 (1977) (suggesting lack of urgency as partial explanation of
Gertz decision).
45. See p. 1739 suPra.
46. 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
47. Id. at 367 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (flexible standard of care creates danger jury
will convert it into instrument for suppressing speech); cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 406 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part) (determination of truth permits jury
prejudice to institute system of censorship); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political
Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 327
(1978) (juries fail to protect minority viewpoints against exercise of governmental power
supported by majority). For an example of an apparent attempt to suppress unpopular
views through use of an unusually high damage award, see New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Alabama Supreme
Court upholding jury award of $500,000 for false defamation in paid advertisement
describing racial confrontations).
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court's judgment may be coercively enforced, a threat to diversity in-
heres in any form of a defamation trial.
The defamation trial is an attempt to respond to a breakdown in
the public marketplace of expression. If the truth naturally prevailed,
defamatory harm would be minimal and the need for legal redress
largely obviated. But the impact of an initial media statement may
warp public perception and render attempts at rebuttal ineffective. 43
The adversarial context of a defamation trial, then, provides a delibera-
tive atmosphere that allows the defamation plaintiff to rebut injurious
charges .4
If this atmosphere could be replicated without the coercive potential
of the defamation trial, diversity values could be enhanced beyond
the Gertz formula without sacrificing its protection of reputational
interests. Harm caused by defamatory falsehood could be minimized
without the potential for suppression, which resort to legal remedies
inevitably entails.50
C. A Lack of Self-Help Incentives
Gertz continued to rely primarily on the damage award as a remedy
for defamatory harm.51 Nevertheless, although its analysis of self-help
was flawed in two ways, the Court recognized a role for self-help in
mitigating reputational harm.52 First, the Court failed to provide the
48. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974) ("law of defamation
is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie"); AAFCO Heating
& Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 681, 321
N.E.2d 580, 587 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976) (unlikely that published rebuttal
will receive same degree of public attention as original defamation).
49. But see Fleming, Retraction and Reply: Alternative Remedies for Defamation, 12
U. BRIT. COLUM. L. Rav. 15, 15 (1978) (legal refutation of libel not attended with much,
if any, publicity and may occur "long after the libel has spread its poison").
50. A similar rationale underlies the reduced legal protection afforded the reputation
of a public figure under the First Amendment. If a plaintiff is able to rebut a defama-
tory remark effectively, this self-help is preferable to legal redress. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (state interest in protecting reputation less as op-
portunity for rebuttal greater); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 407 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part) ("[F]alsehoed is more easily tolerated where public attention creates
the strong likelihood of a competition among ideas.")
51. A monetary award, however, can never fully compensate the intangible loss of a
falsely tarnished reputation. See Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group
Libel, 42 CoLum. L. REv. 727, 731 (1942) (emphasis on damages blinds courts to "in-
tangibles of honor"). Moreover, the damages remedy is a poor foundation on which to
reconcile reputational and First Amendment interests. See Fleming, supra note 49, at 15
(damages remedy exacerbates tension between protection of reputation and freedom of
expression).
52. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (self-help minimizes ad-
verse impact of falsehood on reputation); cf. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 47 U.S.L.W.
4840, 4841 (1979) (access to channels of effective communication enables public figures
"through discussion to counter criticism and expose the falsehood and fallacies of de-
famatory statements").
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subject of a defamatory charge an incentive to employ this remedy.
Indeed, if the subject displayed access to effective channels for rebuttal,
he would be likely to confront at trial the more stringent proof
requirements of the actual malice rule.5 3 Second, Gertz considered self-
help only as a remedy after publication. The Court conceded that re-
buttal subsequent to publication "seldom suffices to undo harm of
defamatory falsehood,"' 4 yet it failed to explore more effective methods
of preventing harm.5 If present evidentiary standards were altered to
admit to a defamation trial only the evidence available to the journalist
at the time of publication, they would encourage use of self-help before
publication and often avert reputational harm. This incentive would
comport with Gertz's preference for self-help as a method for redressing
reputational harm and institute the preventive dimension of the
remedy left unexamined by the Court.
III. Fault Reinforced: A Proposed Evidentiary Rule
Present evidentiary standards subvert three major goals of Gertz. By
admitting evidence of falsity without regard to its availability at the
time of publication, these standards induce unwarranted self-censor-
ship, increase the threat to unpopular speech, and undermine self-help
incentives. A rule restricting admissibility to evidence reasonably within
the reach of the journalist when he prepared the defamatory statement
could remedy these weaknesses in current law and realize more fully
the ends sought by Gertz.
A. The Proposal
The rules governing admissibility in a defamation proceeding should
exclude all evidence that a plaintiff refused to disclose to the defendant
in response to detailed defamatory charges and that was not otherwise
reasonably available at the time of publication. Under this rule, a
journalist would be responsible for considering all information reason-
53. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (one defining feature of
public figure is opportunity for rebuttal); cf. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 47 U.S.L.W.
4840, 4841 (U.S. June 26, 1979) (same).
54. 418 U.S. at 344 n.9.
55. Although extremely effective in averting reputational injury, Gertz clearly meant
to outlaw such preventive strategies as maintaining a strict liability rule or allowing
unrestrained punitive damages. See id. at 347-50. Similarly, a prior restraint to enjoin
publication of defamatory falsehood is forbidden by the First Amendment. See New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (quoting Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)) (" 'Any system of prior restraints [bears]
a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.' "); Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) ("chief purpose of [First Amendment] to prevent previous
restraints upon publication").
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ably obtainable when he prepared the article.56 But the rule would
shield him from accountability for information that the subject of an
article refused to disclose and that the journalist could not reasonably
have acquired elsewhere.
Application of this exclusionary rule should depend on two condi-
tions. First, it should be triggered only if the journalist has presented
to the subject the contents of an injurious charge57 and requested
relevant information within the subject's exclusive control. 8 The sub-
ject would thus be put on notice that, if he fails to cooperate, his legal
remedies for defamation might be impaired. Second, the subject should
be required to respond with no greater factual specificity than that
with which the charges were presented. The journalist would thus be
prevented from exploiting the rule to conduct a fishing expedition."
56. For the purpose of evaluating availability, the term "journalist" includes those
employees of a media entity, who, by the appropriate standard of care, should have had
access to the relevant information. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 525-27
(1974) (examining conduct of managing editor).
57. The need for a journalist to initiate this confrontation with the subject would
render the proposed rule inoperative in cases when danger to reputation is not reason-
ably apparent to the journalist at the time of publication. Although Gertz leaves the
issue open, it implies that liability for factual misstatements in such situations may be
constitutionally impermissible. See id. at 348 (considerations would be different for
"factual misstatement whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broad-
caster of its defamatory potential").
58. The trier of fact would have to assess the precise dimensions of the exclusivity
requirement by delimiting the information available to the journalist upon reasonable
effort. The lack of a reasonably available alternative source would render the information
"exclusively" in the subject's possession. An alternative source sufficiently under the in-
fluence of the subject so as to be effectively silenced by him should be deemed within
the subject's exclusive control.
The journalist would be expected to wait a reasonable time for a response. Because a
loss of legal remedies may be at stake, this waiting period should provide sufficient time
for the subject to consult with counsel. Nevertheless, the period should be flexible enough
to accommodate the constitutional role served by reports of fast-breaking news. See note
14 supra (even temporary restraints may have irreversible consequences). Compare Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 157 (1967) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.) (article
on football corruption "in no sense 'hot news' ") with Associated Press v. Walker, 388
U.S. 130, 158 (1967) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.) (companion case to Curtis Publishing)
(news of desegregation riot "require[s] immediate dissemination").
59. Were a journalist to fabricate charges in detail, he conceivably could use the rule
to induce disclosure of information. This danger is minimal, however, because the publica-
tion of unsupported charges might be proven to be substandard conduct even without the
evidence of falsity that the rule would exclude. Cf. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
732 (1968) (defense of lack of actual malice "will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for
example, where a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his imagination,
or is based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call"). If a potential defamation
plaintiff were fearful that proving fabrication would be difficult without revealing in-
formation he exclusively held, he could often rebut the charge through selective disclo-
sure without revealing matters he most wished to keep secret. For example, a person
accused of wrongdoing at location X could refute the charge by demonstrating his presence




The rule would function meaningfully only if the original accusations
were made in considerable detail.60 Assuming such factual specificity
in the journalist's accusations, neither a statement of "no comment"
nor broad, conclusory denials would reserve a subject's right to intro-
duce underlying facts at a defamation proceeding. 61
B. Advantages of the Proposed Rule
The proposed exclusionary rule reflects the principle that protecting
reputation through anything more than the minimum necessary restric-
tions on speech is contrary to the First Amendment. 02 By restricting
assessment of a journalist's inquiry to those facts available to him at the
time of publication, the rule eliminates the prejudicial effect of ad-
mitting evidence of ultimate falsity unrelated to the determination of
fault or actual malice. The standards of conduct for finding liability
would be no more stringent in practice than Gertz intended. By focus-
ing the defamation inquiry on factors within a journalist's control, the
60. A vague accusation could be met by an equally general response without sacrificing
the right to introduce evidence of undisclosed facts. For example, the unsupported ac-
cusation, "'[w]e know all about you, and you better confess,'" Jenoff v. Hearst Corp.,
453 F. Supp. 541, 549 (D. Md. 1978) (quoting defendant's reporter), could be met by the
disclaimer, "no, I'm innocent," without the subject losing his right to introduce evidence
detailing his innocence.
61. The proposed rule undercuts the force of an unsubstantiated denial coupled with
a threat to sue by permitting only prepublication disclosures to influence the determina-
tion of fault or actual malice. Cf. note 41 supra (describing case of self-censorship in
such situation under current law); Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d
113, 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977) (actual malice "cannot be predicated
on mere denials, however vehement; such denials are so commonplace in the world of
polemical charge and countercharge that, in themselves, they hardly alert the con-
scientious reporter to the likelihood of error").
The proposed evidentiary rule would restrict only evidence submitted by the defama-
tion plaintiff. Arguably, it would be unfair to permit the journalist to introduce evidence
of truth unavailable to him at the time of publication without permitting the plaintiff
to introduce similar evidence of falsity. Yet if the article were true, such a result would
be mandated by the truth defense, see W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 796-99, and possibly
by the Constitution, see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 497-500 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring) (constitutional requirement of truth defense implicit in Sullivan
and Gertz standards of care). If it appeared that the article was false and that inequity
might result from permitting the journalist to present selectively evidence of truth dis-
closed after publication without granting a corresponding right to the plaintiff, a court
could infer a form of waiver. In such cases, presentation of postpublication evidence by
the journalist would waive the proposed evidentiary restrictions on the plaintiff.
62. See note 4 supra. Although the proposed rule will be applied primarily in a news
media setting, its functional justifications apply whether the party invoking it is an urban
newspaper or broadcaster, a private pamphleteer, or a backyard gossip; communications
by each spread information and promote diversity. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
704 (1972) (freedom of press includes pamphleteer with mimeograph as much as large
metropolitan publisher). The rule thus avoids the problem of defining and providing
special privileges to an institutional press. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 795-802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (identifying problems with theory that
institutional press entitled to special First Amendment rights).
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rule permits a journalist to estimate in advance the practical contours
of a fault-based standard. The added certainty that fault or actual
malice will be the effective, as well as the nominal, standard of care
reduces self-censorship to the levels warranted by Gertz.63
The exclusionary rule also protects the value of diversity articulated
in Gertz by limiting the admissible evidence of an article's content to
that necessary for determining fault or actual malice. The less judges
and juries are influenced by the content of a defamatory statement, the
less likely they are to employ legal remedies to suppress unpopular
speech.
Moreover, by encouraging the journalist to confront the subject of
an article with defamatory charges and encouraging the subject to
disclose relevant information to the journalist, the rule facilitates
resolution of a potentially defamatory dispute before publication. The
reduced need for legal remedies minimizes the threat to diversity
values that inheres in the defamation trial.
Similarly, the proposed rule encourages use of the self-help remedy
identified in Gertz. 4 By conditioning admission of evidence on its
63. Self-censorship occurs when publication decisions are made on the basis of potential
liability. See note 4 supra. By granting the journalist greater control over his exposure to
liability, the proposed rule would reduce self-censorship and enable publication decisions
to be guided by journalistic rather than legal factors. See note 4 supra.
64. The proposed rule refrains from actually requiring disclosure of information, or
from granting the journalist automatic access to the information. It simply requires a
subject to disclose information in order to preserve in full force his defamation remedy.
The subject confronts a similar fate at a defamation proceeding when he must choose
between nondisclosure and a full legal defense. Cf. Anderson v. Nixon, 444 F. Supp. 1195,
1199 (D.D.C. 1978) (plaintiff must disclose source for his "official harassment" claim if
he desires legal vindication). The proposed rule imposes an additional cost to the subject
only by encouraging him to disclose guarded information at an earlier moment. Even
then, failure to disclose this information does not preclude legal redress, but merely
restricts the information admissible at a defamation proceeding. The First Amendment
may permit a privacy action for public disclosures of truthful information. Compare Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (leaving open possibility of public
disclosure tort) and Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 541, 483 P.2d 34, 42-
43, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 874-75 (1971) (granting privacy right if matter not newsworthy
and disclosure offensive) with Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 498
n.2 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting Gertz abandonment of "public interest"
standard undercuts basis of public disclosure tort) and Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 L. &. CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 335-36 (1966) (inquiring
whether "privilege to serve public interest in news" has not become "so overpowering
as virtually to swallow" privacy tort). If there is such a remedy, the proposed privilege
provides greater protection of legitimate privacy interests than does present defamation
law. The cost in privacy terms of revealing private information to a journalist before
publication is far less than that of having to disclose it in defense of a defamation suit.
If a defamation plaintiff releases private information at trial, it may be published with
impunity. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (state cannot
impose sanctions for publication of truthful information contained in official court
records). Yet if the same individual releases the information to a journalist privately,
the journalist cannot publish it without subjecting himself to a suit for invasion of
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availability at the time of publication, the rule encourages the subject
of injurious charges to disclose information in his exclusive possession
in order to retain his defamation remedy unimpaired. The rule thus
provides the subject with an incentive to invoke the self-help remedy
before publication occurs. Moreover, the rule encourages personal con-
frontation, a situation more likely than the public marketplace to result
in a legitimate and effective rebuttal.6 5 When self-help succeeds in such
circumstances, it protects reputation more effectively than the incom-
plete compensation provided by damage awards. 60
privacy. Although disclosure of a private matter to the journalist alone raises some privacy
concern, mass publication of such matter is a far more serious invasion of an individual's
privacy. See Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis'
Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well? 46 TEx. L. REV. 611, 619 (1968) (essence of
privacy wrong is "that a private life has been transformed into a public spectacle").
65. A reply in a face-to-face situation, with its opportunity for informal discourse, is
likely to be far more effective in redressing misconceptions than is a rebuttal ad-
dressed to a media audience. See Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First
Amendment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 915, 934 n.140 (1978); cf. Green, Political
Freedom of the Press and the Libel Problem, 56 TEx. L. REV. 341, 361 (1978) (direct
charge to plaintiff himself gives opportunity for immediate confrontation).
66. See note 51 supra. Similarly, the exclusionary rule safeguards reputation more
effectively than the right to reply or retraction approaches, see, e.g., Fleming, supra note
49, without the concomitant infringement on editorial freedom, see, e.g., Bezanson, supra
note 44, at 732-33; Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HAsTINGs LJ. 631, 634 (1975).
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